Participatory health system priority setting: evidence from a budget experiment by Costa-Font, Joan et al.
  
Joan Costa Font, Joan Rovira Forns, Azusa Sato 
Participatory health system priority setting: 
evidence from a budget experiment 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Costa-Font, Joan, Forns , Joan Rovira and Sato, Azusa (2015) Participatory health system 
priority setting: evidence from a budget experiment. Social Science & Medicine. ISSN 0277-9536 
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.10.042 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2015 The Authors 
CC-BY-NC-ND 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64144/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 1 
 
SSM-D-15-00563R4 
 
 
 
Participatory Health System Priority 
Setting: Evidence from a Budget 
Experiment  
 
 
Joan Costa Font,  
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Joan Rovira Forns 
University of Barcelona 
 
Azusa Sato 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact Address: Dr. Joan Costa-Font, London School of Economics, Cowdray House, 
Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE.  E-Mail: J.Costa-Font@lse.ac.uk 
 2 
Abstract 
 
Budget experiments can provide additional guidance to heath system reform requiring the 
identification of a subset of programs and services that accrue the highest social value to 
‘communities’. Such experiments simulate a realistic budget resource allocation 
assessment among competitive programs, and position citizens as decision makers 
responsible for making ‘collective sacrifices’. This paper explores the use of a 
participatory budget experiment (with 88 participants clustered in social groups) to model 
public health care reform, drawing from a set of realistic scenarios for potential health 
care users. We measure preferences by employing a contingent ranking alongside a 
budget allocation exercise (termed ‘willingness to assign’) before and after program cost 
information is revealed.  Evidence suggests that the budget experiment method tested is 
cognitively feasible, incentive compatible. The main downside is the existence of ex-ante 
“cost estimation” bias. Additionally, we find that participants appeared to underestimate 
the net social gain of redistributive programs. Relative social value estimates can serve as 
a guide to aid priority setting at a health system level. 
 
Keywords: Catalonia, budget pie, budget experiments, willingness to assign, preference 
revelation, , priority setting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Health care decision making under publicly financed systems is a ‘community 
commodity’. In other words, rather than a market allocation, health care decisions in such 
systems are the result of a  ‘socio-political market’, whereby social exchanges highly 
depend on social norms (e.g., equal access for equal need) (Heyman and Ariely , 2004) 
and political processes. Nonetheless, although decisions in publicly funded health 
systems are generally grounded in a political mandate, rules of democracy alone do not 
guarantee that the population’s values are accounted for, especially the socially excluded 
population who are less likely to be electorally relevant. At best, traditional decision-
making imperfectly reflects broad preferences. Relying on health maximisation is equally 
problematic. For instance, Lindholm et al (1997), using interviews of Swedish politicians, 
reveal that public preferences do not follow cost-effectiveness criteria in the presence of 
inequality. Stafinski et al (2011) also highlight the importance of social values and 
distributive preferences and other values (personal responsibility, caregiving 
responsibilities etc) in resource allocation decisions.  
 
Under such a scenario, decision-makers’ preferences for health programs are arguably not 
in line with public preference, which calls for methods to analyse public participation in 
health system decision-making that supplements cost-effectiveness analysis. Whitty and 
Littlejohns (2014) find that in Australia, health decision making competes with several 
inter-related social values, and therefore suggest that participation can be a way to 
enhance the process.  However, when multiple goals are at stake, decision making must 
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be contextualised through Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) where several 
outcomes - including wider social effects of an intervention - are accounted for (Hauk et 
al, 2003, Mitton et al, 2011), and macro level health system approaches such as the so 
called ‘program budgeting and marginal analysis ‘(PBMA) as per Mitton et al (2003) are 
used.  Methodologies which attempt to improve the existing elicitation of preferences for 
health programs, (such as direct elicitation willingness to pay exercises) and discrete 
choice experiments, present one way forward.  However, as we discuss below, 
willingness to pay studies do not show consistent valuations.  
 
In any event, when such exercises are undertaken, preferences over a given set of health 
programs may exhibit at least two different dimensions: an individual (selfish) and a 
collective (altruistic) dimension as described by Margolis (1982). Of course, the share of 
one value or the other may be cultural specific. Hence, the individual intensity of 
preferences for different health programs is interdependent or interpersonal (Mooney 
1994; Bazerman et al, 1992). 
 
Both laboratory and natural experiments call for a redefinition of preference elicitation 
mechanisms, so as to pick up individuals’ collective sacrifice (rather than exclusively rely 
on individual welfare gain). Specifically, we propose a budget pie experiment as a 
straightforward way to elicit preference in settings where spending cuts (or expansions) 
to collectively funded health services take place, in order to add an additional dose of 
realism.  The budget pie experiment focuses on soliciting responses to allocate a fixed 
budget to a set of potential alternatives (programs), which are sometimes referred to as 
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constant sum comparisons (or scaling), and can be implemented in pairs of programs or a 
limited number of programs. The advantage of budget pies is that they make the 
respondent consider the whole budget, and hence the sacrifice of allocating more funds to 
one program over another As a result traditional ‘yea saying’ behaviour of willingness to 
pay experiments is reduced (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998).  
 
Budget pie experiments have been examined in the health context in Skedgel et al (2013) 
in a choice context. Indeed, Skedgel et al (2013) draws from discrete choice techniques 
and budget pie strategies with varying health system atttibutes. They find that budget pie 
techniques are more aligned with societal preferences, but  discrete choice respondent 
appear to be  more consistent. Among the dimensions of benefit examined, health gain 
was the most valued attribute. Schwappach (2003) finds that by using a budget pie 
allocation mechanism, only a small fraction of individuals prioritised health gain, with 
many willing to sacrifice some health gain to attain more equal distribution of resources. 
 
Alternative willingness to pay (WTP) approaches tend to focus on individualistic decision 
settings to measure the social value of a program, which unsurprisingly does not 
necessarily give rise to consistent outcomes (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998), and rarely 
contemplate explicitly the collective budget restrictions that individuals face as ‘citizens’ 
in addition to that of individuals or potential health care ‘users’ (Eckerlund, et al, 1995).  
In contrast, a fair share allocation rule’, as proposed by Margolis (1982), takes into 
account the observation that when humans allocate resources they always make a trade-
off between individual and social values.  Such ideas have been recently corroborated 
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through evidence of motivational crowding out (Frey and Jegen, 2001, Heyman and 
Ariely, 2004). Kahneman and Ritov (1995) find that in a collective context, WTP 
measures may elicit the willingness to contribute, rather than consumer preferences. 
 
In this paper, we report on a method for measuring collective sacrifice with something 
more than an individual’s utility (lathering preferences) by relying on budget allocation 
exercises with and without the disclosure of program cost information.   While some 
research has shown that it is possible to elicit the joint WTP for multiple programmes 
(Protière et al, 2004; Robins and Simonsen (2002)), results are inconsistent. Furthermore, 
although alternative non-monetary elicitation techniques such as willingness to wait 
(Thomas et al, 2000) have been put forward, they do not necessarily allow for 
generalisation to multiple programmes. An alternative is a structured value referendum 
(McDaniels, 1996). Nonetheless, when budget information is provided for only one 
service, but not put into context with the costs and trade-offs related to other programs, 
the very mention of a tax, all else being equal, will give rise to less support for that 
service. Hence, budget experiments can capture a wide collective decision making 
dimension when other methods fail (Bergquist et al, 2004; Petters, 1996). Rather than 
focusing on eliciting the marginal willingness to pay for consumption, trade-offs are 
between various programs, by allocating budget increments (or cuts) to the programs. If 
preference elicitation methods are to guide priority-setting decisions, it is necessary to 
examine other preference elicitation methods, which deal with sets of multiple health 
system benefits, and collective decision-making scenarios, which take into account 
opportunity costs of funding other programs. For instance, Franken and Koolman (2013 
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page 29) distinguish between utility derived from interaction between people and the 
health system (“how people are treated by the health system”), and utility obtained from 
living under institutions (“how allocative and redistributive decisions are taken”). In 
addition to process utility (or benefits associated with the delivery of care process that 
might not improve health outcomes), other important benefits are those associated with 
equity concerns. Equity in the financing of health care is health system benefit in the 
ranking of health systems (Murray et al, 2000). However, there is some criticism on 
weighting methods and the implicit assumption of a common ideology (Richardson, 
2003) or the same welfare trade-offs across countries (Smith, 2002). 
 
We agree with Franken and Koolman (2013) that the structure of a health system depends 
in large part on society’s choices concerning resource allocation; and hence it is 
important to elicit ex ante socially inclusive personal preferences in social justice 
valuations. However, it is unlikely that individuals will have formed preferences for 
concepts unless there has been a deliberative process before and health decisions may 
reflect social choices.  Hence, we have developed a budget experiment instead which 
includes group deliberation prior to individual choices being made.  From a social choice 
perspective, participants were not told, and could not guess, how preferences were going 
to be aggregated and hence we would not expect any strategic behaviour. Second, as 
preferences were elicited by groups, there were  no advantages from free riding (as we 
show later, we could not find any individual characteristic correlating with valuations).  
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In the following, we describe the subject background, the need for using budget 
experiments as an alternative to willingness to pay studies and we propose a specific 
budget experiment based on a realistic health care reform and examine the evidence to 
inform both the applicability of the methodology as well as the results of the experiment 
itself.  That is, we aim to elicit what we regard as the ‘collective sacrifice’ undertaking a 
budget experiment that simulates a political market, where individuals are asked to 
participate in realistically setting their health system reform budget before and after 
program costs are revealed. This equates to an alternative measure of value to individual 
sacrifice.  
 
To preview our results briefly, we find that budget experiments under a participatory 
setting did not receive significant protest responses and allowed revealing a consistent 
prioritisation of health care programs, although we find evidence of some ‘ex-ante’ cost 
estimation. The valuation of different programs are indicative that programs which were 
lowly priced, when costs were revealed, improved their final ranking, whereas programs 
where cost was high, reduced their final ranking. From these results we conclude that 
individuals seem to be cost sensitive although the magnitude might not be large enough 
to change the average order of the program rankings. Our findings seem to suggest that 
individuals perceive more than health gain in health systems reform but importantly 
results suggest that in allocating health care funds, process utility benefits do not garner a 
high budget, and programs improving access to health care coverage, although highly 
valued, would not be sufficiently funded.   
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2. Background 
 
 
2.1 Eliciting the social sacrifice for health care programs 
Governmental decisions in areas where the potential impact of social welfare is high may 
suffer from information deficiencies (Willoughby and Melkers 1998).  Asides from 
making decisions based on technically determined results, it is possible to determine ex-
ante, through experimental designs, on how best to distribute the existing budget. This 
implies eliciting preferences for different program budgeting options, which to an extent 
removes political pressure from the estimation of budgets for each specific program. 
Contingent valuation studies suffer from the existence of order effects when multiple 
goods are subject to valuation (Payne et al, 2000).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that different elicitation methods give rise to different 
preference rankings.  In health, programs may be explicitly ranked, or estimations of 
willingness to pay extracted.  In the former, a marginal approach is often taken – for 
example, programmes for the expansion of health care coverage are anchored to the most 
preferred option (Olsen et al, 2005). However, evidence suggests that the value of public 
goods falls when the good is valued with a sequence of other goods (Carson et al, 1998; 
Carson, 2000). This feature cannot be explained by economic theory unless we accept 
that individuals must be confronted with realistic decision-making contexts where real 
opportunity costs are taken into account.  One of the alternatives being proposed is to 
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introduce direct comparison of programs. Indeed, while some individuals support certain 
programs, others oppose them strongly, and this is likely to be linked to distribution 
implications of some programs (Corneo and Fong, 2006). 
 
In political and social markets, individuals may be modelled as following ‘expressive 
behaviour’, where they are concerned about the social, rather than individual, impact of 
health programs. Kahneman and Ritov (1997) find that in a public goods context, WTP 
measures elicit willingness to contribute rather than consumer preferences per se. 
Another problem in valuing health care is the presence of some moral satisfaction as 
health care investment is seen as a good cause (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). 
Donaldson et al (2002) find that consistency of WTP studies depends on the alternative 
courses of action under comparison.  This might indicate that an individual’s reference 
point in valuing goods differs when different programs are valued together, and in 
particular, specific program characteristics might stimulate certain utility dimensions 
compared to others (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). Furthermore, Donaldson et al (2002) 
find that respondents do not discriminate between different treatments when they are 
unaware that alternatives exist, which indicates that preferences are sensitive to the fact 
that different courses of action are made explicit to decision makers. However, Olsen et 
al (2005), using data from different countries, find little consistency across explicit 
rankings and willingness to pay estimates. This shows that that WTP estimates are not 
particularly appropriate to elicit relative values of competing health care programs.  In 
other words, to judge the suitability of a methodology to elicit preferences to guide health 
care reforms one would expect the implicit ranking revealed by the value measure to 
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correlate highly with the explicit ranking individuals provide, so long as elicitation 
measures meet convergent validity criteria. Finally, monetary preferences are argued to 
be subject to monetary illusion, so that individuals would tend to reason on nominal, 
rather than real, terms (Shafir et al, 1997). 
 
Another reason for measuring collective sacrifice is because individual valuations reflect 
some form of social valuation, and hence different elicitation methods might trigger 
motivational crowding out (Bowles, 1998). Frey and Oberholzer (1997) argue that the 
introduction of monetary payments might reduce the intrinsic motivation to behave 
altruistically or perform civic duty.  Similarly, individual revealed preferences from 
choices both real (states preferences) and hypothetical (contingent valuation experiments) 
might differ from true normative preferences because social constraints can trigger 
different protest responses, as well as a variety of well-established biases such as limited 
experience and passive choice, complexity, inter-temporal dimension and third party 
marketing (Beshears et al, 2008).  
 
2.2 Participatory budget experiments 
 
There have been some experiences of participatory budgetary priority setting exercises in 
the US, in defining drug coverage (Sacramento Health Care Decisions, 2006). There is 
growing interest in involving citizens in policy development to ensure that decisions are 
legitimate, and reflect broad social values (Bombard et al, 2011). There is growing 
interest in involving a broader range of stakeholders in public policy development and 
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HTA-related policy more specifically including patients and service users (or 
‘consumers’).This enthusiasm stems from a need to ensure that decisions are informed, 
transparent and legitimate (Abelson, 2003, 2007). Universal access, ‘choice’, and ‘quality 
care’ were identified as core values that should be considered in the evaluation of health 
technologies and ensuing recommendations.  
 
Based on these experiences, preferences are best elicited using collective decision making 
settings, so we propose a budget pie experiment format termed  ‘willingness to assign’ 
(WTAS) method, which will expand the traditional willingness to pay (WTP) format to a 
collective setting. As in a traditional budget pie experiment, participants were asked to act 
as collective decision makers, and allocate the maximum amount they would wish to 
assign to a set of given health care programs under a fixed budget constraint (funded by 
their own taxes). They could reassign their allocations so as to elicit marginal valuations 
for a program coverage expansion where tradeoffs between health care programs were 
made explicit. The interpretation of results applying this method has been carried out 
elsewhere (Costa-Font and Rovira, 2005). The experiment was undertaken by grouping 
individuals of similar social class and skills to enable the examination of differences in 
preferences across groups. We employed a deliberative approach, given that it is more 
likely to elicit informed judgements when it provides a space for the exchange of 
experiences and opinions (Yankelovich, 1991). Finally, a direct ranking of programs was 
asked for, to test the consistency of individual responses. The methods is similar to that of 
Blomquist et al (2004), but the difference lies in that we rely on a deliberative process 
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rather than a survey, and we attempt to elicit the relative trade-offs between programs 
within the health sector rather than allocation between sectors. 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1 Experimental Scheme 
The experimental scheme can be contemplated in terms of a three-stage process: 
In the first step (‘benefit identification’ exercise to elicit health system benefits), a set of 
focus groups aimed at benefit identification. Each focus group was held at a different 
geographical location within Catalan provinces. Moderators ensured that every 
participant contributed to the discussion with opinions and arguments (to avoid more 
assertive participants to manipulate the course of the debate) and  discussion were 
recorded and transcribed.   
 
In the second stage (the ‘benefit assessment’ exercise which was only partially 
participatory and was mainly done following expert assessments), a set of ten 
hypothetical health care programs were develop, each of which would be expected to be 
able to deliver the benefit improvements identified in the first step. The concept of health 
system benefit was defined broadly as any welfare increase resulting from a new health 
care programme. The programs were designed (with consent from participants) by 
officials of the Catalan health system to make them realistic interventions that met the 
expected benefits, which the health system at the time was not offering.  
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In the final, third stage (program valuation stage), individuals were asked to take part in a 
benefit ranking exercise (by order of preference), a budget pie (also referred as WTAS) 
exercise and a cost based ranking exercise of the programs designed in the previous stage. 
This last section began with an explanation of the program and a brief discussion (lasting 
40 minutes) followed by a contingent ranking exercise (30 minutes) of the programs 
without preliminary knowledge of its cost. Then, a budget pie (or willingness to assign 
WTAS) exercise and in some cases a willingness to pay taxes question was answered in 
20 minutes and results were discussed in under 10 minutes. Finally, a rank ordering 
exercise was repeated but now the program costs were revealed to participants without 
any further discussion. In total, the exercises took about two hours until completion.  
 
This stage included a survey by using cards where every program to be valued was 
briefly described and participants were rewarded in each group. Before every session, 
participants were requested to fill in a basic personal questionnaire.  Both the 
documentation and the questionnaires alongside a reference guide were mailed 
beforehand. 
 
The implementation of the research project benefited from both the participation and 
advice of two social researchers (different from the health system experts) who helped to 
identify the characteristics of the representative social groups of study.  Their aim was to 
identify groups that brought together a mix of people who shared similar backgrounds. 
Participants were informed about the purpose of the exercises as well as basic details of 
the Catalan health system in an accessible way. Ethical clearance was obtained in 
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October 1999 from University of Barcelona social and economics science ethics 
committee, and data collection took place between 1999 and 2002.  
 
3.2 Participant selection 
 
When a large set of health programs are to be prioritised, standard surveys present 
limitations. Small-scale experiments, and particularly a participatory group experiment 
format including the focus group approach, can allow for more in-depth investigation of 
the association between individual priorities and values, reduce misunderstandings of 
questions where advantages of each programme can be discussed and adequately capture 
the decision-making problem. We recorded information about age, education health care 
interventions, residence and employment history which helped further group stratification 
in groups ranging between 6 and15 participants (including the pilot experiment). Table 
A1 describes the profile of the participants in each group and the number of participants.  
Altogether they make up a sample of 88 observations clustered in different participant 
groups. 
 
3.3 Elicitation instruments 
 
Different methods show clearly their different aims (reflected in Table 3). The first 
method allows one to check consistency with WTAS (or budget pie allocations) results, 
since ordinal preferences should show a significant association with cardinal measures.. 
The third cost priority question tries to provide some notion of how consistent the 
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individual responses were. Since the program cost is a negative dimension (even under 
collectively funded systems as it reduced funding for other programs), we expect it would 
trigger a reduction in the level of priority assigned to every program. Finally, we took 
into consideration an alternative and more traditional elicitation technique for 
comparison, eliciting the WTP taxes for each health program.  Consistency of 
respondents’ valuations was measured using Spearman correlations, namely correlation 
coefficients of ordinal outcomes. The assumption is that observed ranking can be 
expressed as follows: 0eVar0eEeVR ij  )(,)(, , where the ranking of a group can 
be understood as an addition of a “real“ ranking plus a random error, with zero mean and 
constant variance. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the rankings 
and random errors. From this assumption the Spearman coefficient is: 
2
2
2
x
v
XV


  , 
varying between –-1 and 1. 
 
The different elicitations tools were the following: 
 
A. Contingent ranking: this method hypothetically captures the ordinal priority of 
different programmes. Participants provide their rankings on a scale of 1–10.  
 
Question (1): Please could you rank each programme (after every single programme had 
been explained and comprehension was ensured) from 1 (the least preferred) to 10 (the 
most preferred)? 
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B. Budget pie or willingness to assign (WTAS).  This was based on an open-ended 
valuation question that considered a hypothetical budgetary increase (that does 
not exceed the total budget). The purpose is to elicit the maximum amount 
individuals would assign to a set of given health care programs under a fixed 
budget constraint. The idea underlying this method is one of identifying relative 
values and trade-offs, therefore any budget size variation according to the 
monotonicity criteria should not affect the preferences elicited, as they were 
considered in terms of relative values.  
 
Question 2:  Imagine being asked to allocate the health care budget as if you were the 
decision maker.  You have 1,000 million € budget to assign the money to each health 
programme in the system.  How would you, as a ‘citizen’, assign public resources of a 
realistic list of health programs that have been designed from a previous list of health 
system benefits you contributed to reveal?  
 
The advantage of the budget pie (WTAS) format employed here  is that it allows us to 
compare the valuation of different programs using a similar measure, which in turn 
makes it easy to  identify (partial) trade-offs between different programs that satisfy 
heterogeneous benefits. We consider the decision making unit as small groups )( in , 
representative of a societal profile (  }{ inN  ). Let us assume a hypothetical health 
system resource allocation (e.g., Catalan Health Service (CHS)) and assume planned 
budget increase (e.g., 240 million €), to fund a set of random number (e.g., ten) of "new 
programs". The total cost of those (ten) programs is in excess of the fixed capital budget; 
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therefore some programs may not be funded. Hence, the experiment implicitly attempts 
to assist rationing decisions in a multidimensional benefit or utility framework.   The 
money metric nature of budget pies can be of some additional use if we are interested in a 
cost-benefit decision making framework.  The context of policy decision-making was 
explained to respondents as stating that the government was considering a coverage 
expansion that would satisfy the potential health system benefits revealed in a prior 
exercise.  The list of programs was carefully explained to participants, a written list was 
posted in a white board, and a set of programs cards describing each program features. 
Participants were asked to act as if they were advisors of the Catalan Health Plan reform 
board. To further enhance a realistic scenario, a summarised (and again realistic) public 
health system budget was revealed and participants were made aware that every program 
has been partially paid by their taxes. The latter was expected to enhance the notion of 
‘collective sacrifice’ which we expect the elicitation technique to identify. Finally, it is 
important to note that the allocation exercise requires participants to allocate funds an 
addition to the existing budget at the time of the study, which was announced and 
explained to participants.  
 
One of the potential problems is the potential complexity and limited experience of 
participants as decision makers, rather than relying on survey base methods. In contrast, 
Blomquist et al, (2004) and Skedgel et al (2013) we use a used a participatory and group 
allocation mechanism.  Participants could then engage in a discussion as a group, on the 
reasons for their collective decisions. Given that not all groups were equally dynamic and 
participatory, in some cases extra effort was required to engage participants and aid 
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responses; for example, some people were reminded to think as if they had to purchase 
food for their family for which they had a fixed amount of money. Moreover, they were 
not required to expend the whole budget; any left over money would be assigned to other 
public sector benefits. 
 
C. Cost based Ranking: To understand the consistency of WTAS responses and their 
sensitivity to the cost of every program the previous program ranking was repeated but 
this time incorporated information on the health care program costs. Indeed, the 
hypothetical cost amount was calculated according to whole programs costs (by senior 
officials of the Catalan health service to make is realistic as possible). The design was 
such that the total set of programs should not be completely covered by the budgetary 
increase. Hence, it would force individuals to make choices based on a notion of 
‘collective sacrifice’. The program cost may be conceptualized as a “negative benefit” to 
be weighed against the benefits each program attained. In other words, participants would 
prefer a program that involves a reduced cost to an equivalent program – yielding the 
same benefits involving higher costs. Therefore, a higher degree of cost sensitivity might 
be interpreted as economic rationality. The latter was tested by comparing cost based 
ranking (after the program costs were revealed), with both the implicit ranking from 
budget allocations and contingent rankings of programs (before program cost information 
was revealed to participants). The exact cost based ranking question is described below: 
 
Question (3): Please could you rank every program (after every program was explained 
and understood by respondents) from 1 (the least preferred) to 10 (the most preferred) 
after the costs associated with each of the following are revealed? 
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Finally, a willingness to pay taxes question, using a payment card mechanism for each 
program, was included for comparison. This question as described below in Table 3 was 
elicited by asking: ‘how much extra tax would you be willing to pay annually to have this 
program covered by the (Catalan) health service? (A payment card including N/A option 
was included with quantities ranging from 0 to 500€ or more). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Benefit identification and analysis 
 
The identification of health system benefits tries to reflect, in a simplified way, basic 
outcomes. The outcomes that every participant reveals can be positive, identifying 
benefits for the health care system, or negative, highlighting shortcomings of health care 
systems. The former is represented by a positive (+) mark (when participants felt the 
health services ought to deliver) and health system deficiencies are marked with a 
negative (-) mark (when the participant felt that the health service was failing to deliver 
something they had expected to be delivered). It is important to note that researchers did 
not predetermine nor define the benefit dimensions, but respondents, in their social 
groups, reached a consensus on them.  After the identification of health system outcomes, 
the first part of the experiment is completed (see Table 1).  Importantly, this set of 
exercises revealed that people identify different benefits accruing from the health system, 
among which health gain is the most acknowledged.   
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
4.2 Health program identification  
 
Given that health system benefits are usually tailored by using sets of programs and 
policies, we converted all choices into an available set of alternatives from which they 
can valued and identified. A set of ten programs was designed and benefits were 
classified in five dimensions: coverage, accessibility, quality, public health and social. 
With the assistance of some health system officials, we estimated an approximate but 
realistic cost for each program (at the time of study) and made sure that the proposal 
would increase status quo health system coverage so that it remained a realistic exercise.   
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
4.3 Preference elicitation 
  
Table 3 describes the different elicitation techniques employed in the exercise, its 
objective and limitations to be tested. We began with a contingent ranking of existing 
health programs and asked participants rank them on a scale of 1-10. This elicitation 
exercise attempted to capture the ordinal preferences of participants for every program. 
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After individual elicitation we published the results and a discussion took place about the 
reasons for valuation. Table 4 suggests that when we examine rankings, the population 
reveals a priority for extending coverage of dental care and co-payment reduction 
(programs 9 and 10), both programs that improve equity in the access to health care, 
followed by program 8, which aims to improve information for prevention purposes. In 
contrast programs that target organisational aspects of the NHS receive lower rankings, 
suggesting that individuals might not be able to fully appreciate the value of managerial 
practices and organisation structures.  Standard errors, reflecting the variability or 
consensus on the estimates, were similar except for the highest valued programs where 
we observed half the variability in the valuation.  
 
[Insert Table 3 and 4 about here] 
 
As a second preference revelation exercise we elicited cardinal and implicit trade-offs 
between health care programs by allocating an expected budget which is collectively 
funded.  Consistently, the highest and the lowest programs average funding assigned 
correspond to the equivalent rankings as explained before. Only one program, medical 
checkups, did not receive comparable funding to programs 4 and 5 despite receiving a 
higher rank.  As we argue in the conclusion, we interpret this finding as suggestive that 
participants were taking the implicit cost into consideration when formulating their value 
assessments. 
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Since our data are ordinal the best way to test for validity is to look at the consistency of 
rankings. Consistency estimates are reflected in Table 4, in which the Spearman 
correlation coefficient is always consistently positive and in many cases significant with 
values around 0.4-0.7. Compared willingness to pay taxes, we did not fin a sign reversion 
in WTAS responses. This could be because we did not employ the standard referendum 
approach and instead used a payment card. Another explanation is that in a collectively 
funded health system, health services are often used irrespectively of its cost. Finally, 
when we compare WTAS values and costs for each program one can notice that although 
the two programs bringing equity benefits are highly prioritised and valued, equity 
programs are unlikely to be funded given their high costs.  This result leads us to the final 
exercise of cost sensitivity. Table 5 displays more information on cost ranking vis-a-vis 
an implicit preference ranking from budget pie (WTAS) allocations as well as cost 
rankings using the non-parametric test of the equality of rankings. Importantly, results 
indicate that although the rankings are very similar in average values they fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of no equality for all programs but number 2.  However, there is some 
level of sensitivity to the cost as Table 5 reveals.  
 
Upon revealing the cost of programs, participants were asked asked to rank the programs 
again (which we refer to as ‘cost ranking’). As Table 5 suggests we did not find 
significant changes in aggregate ordering, which could suggest that differences in cost 
may not be perceived to be large enough to overcome differences in benefits. Another 
explanation lies in that individuals might uphold some preliminary estimate of the cost of 
certain programs, and hence their valuations might be biased (ex-ante cost-estimate bias). 
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Alternatively, it may be also due to lexicographic order, where differences do exist but 
they do not manage to change the order of preference.   If there are changes in the 
ordering, then we would be capturing how responses vary in their valuations and 
preferences when cost information is provided.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.4 Consistency and interpretation 
 
Results suggest relevant differences in terms of the consistency criteria across groups. We 
estimated the distance between the two different rankings weighted by the maximum 
possible difference, e.g., if three programs are compared and rankings range from 1 to 3, 
the maximum difference is 2. We find that although participants identified ‘process 
utility’ as an important health system benefit, when they are asked to assign value health 
care programs dealing with such benefit dimension, they obtain a comparatively low 
priority value. One explanation may be due to the programs selected.  Programs dealing 
with cancer may be overvalued, with people showing a moral satisfaction effect; however 
this is not reflected in check-ups. Although respondents do not appear to assign a large 
value to process utility, they do value programs leading to equity benefits (see Table 5). 
Moreover, moral satisfaction may fail to express itself when more than one program is 
valued. The reason is that individuals in this experiment are aware that the assignment of 
an excessive monetary valuation to one program may reduce the available resources for 
alternative programs.  
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5. Discussion 
 
This study has sought to examine the feasibility of a participatory budget experiment to 
identify and value preferences for competing health care programmes in a collective 
funding health system. We have argued that unlike contingent valuation methodologies, a 
budget experiment appears a priori to be more in line with the sort of health system 
decision making in collectively financed health systems. However, the evidence available 
so far on the feasibility of budget experiments is very limited. In addition, we have relied 
on a participatory methodology allows individuals to identify the benefits and then 
convert such benefits into programs, to then value them in a way that suits their social 
preferences and accounts for public sector budget constraints.  This is consistent with 
Scuffham et al (2010) who draw upon a discrete choice model to examine health system 
preferences in the UK and Australia.  However, our experiment employs instead the 
enormous potential of deliberative methods (Mitton et al 2009), which are still 
underdeveloped and worthy of further exploration particularly in the context of public 
insurance coverage expansion. 
 
The contribution of the paper lies in testing a participatory preference elicitation 
methodology and an elicitation technique that does not exhibit protest responses and 
allows the identification of a ‘collective sacrifice’. Furthermore, it overcomes some of the 
problems identified in other budget pie studies that rely on survey data (Skedgel et al, 
2013).  The method combines a set of preference elicitation tools that is of policy use 
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when making resource allocation decisions in the context of health care, especially at 
times of budget cuts, but can which can also be implemented across the board at all times. 
We have found that individuals value more than health gain but programs attaining 
mainly process utility benefits do not garner a high allocation. In contrast, we find that 
programs improving access to health care coverage, although highly valued, would not be 
sufficiently funded in the context of the experiment. This result is suggestive of a quality 
of budget experiments, namely that by valuing more than one program at a time, the 
collective opportunity costs (e.g., not funding other health programs) might have 
curtailed the potential for moral satisfaction in the expression of monetary valuations.  
Finally, we find from a cost based ranking exercise that participants seem to be cost 
sensitive although the magnitude might not be large enough to change the average order 
of the program rankings. Finally, we have found no evidence of an overall lexicographic 
order at both group and individual levels
.
 
 
Limitations 
The proposed methodology has some important limitations: First, respondents might 
already have an estimate about the costs of different programs, and hence suffer from an 
ex-ante “cost estimation” bias. Indeed, we find that individuals, in reporting their WTAS 
estimates, might take implicit costs into consideration (ex-ante cost estimation bias). 
Second, in taking cost into consideration, they appear to underestimate the amount of 
funding required to reimburse a highly valued programs that extend health care converge 
and increase equity of the health system. Third, another of the main problems is the 
existence of fiscal illusion by individuals that participated in the experiment (Pluviani, 
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1972). That is a certain inability to elicit the monetary value of a good accounting for 
purchasing power changes over time. Fourth, a more general weakness of public 
participation mechanism in collective decision making lies in dealing with individual’s 
reluctance to participate which in turn over- represents the preferences of certain 
population groups. Finally, another potential issue to examine in future work is how to 
include a preference for public savings or investment outside health care which exert 
influence on  the health system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Health care reforms in publicly funded health systems calls for further reliance on 
citizen’s valuation to guide priority setting. Most available preference elicitation 
techniques that health economists use either rely on measures of health gain alone (e.g., 
Cost-Effectiveness Analyses), or on individualistic (market based) valuations which 
conflicts with the collective nature of health care decision making (e.g., willingness to 
pay directly or through taxes).  This paper has examined the evidence of a participatory 
budget experiment (budget pie) to guide health care decision making. On the basis of this 
experience we conclude that budget experiments are an operationally feasible way for 
citizens to face the complexities of real decision-making, which are subject to significant 
moral and preference trade-offs. Two main limitation of budget experiments are 
identified, namely the presence of some ex-ante cost estimation, and participants 
appeared to underestimate the net social gain of redistributive programs. Further, some 
research shows that the views of participants in deliberative processes change after being 
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involved in such experiences (Stafinski et al 2014).  Such areas are potential future 
research topics.  
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